Mississippi College School of Law

MC Law Digital Commons
Journal Articles

Faculty Publications

2016

When Does Corporate Criminal Liability for
Insider Trading Make Sense?
John P. Anderson
Mississippi College School of Law, jpanders@mc.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://dc.law.mc.edu/faculty-journals
Part of the Securities Law Commons
Recommended Citation
46 Stetson L. Rev. 147 (2016).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at MC Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of MC Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact walter@mc.edu.

WHEN DOES CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR
INSIDER TRADING MAKE SENSE?
John P. Anderson*
I. INTRODUCTION
Corporations are subject to broad criminal liability for the insider
trading of their employees. Critics have noted that this results in a
harsh irony. “After all,” Professor Jonathan Macey of Yale Law argues,
“it is generally the employer who is harmed by the insider trading.”1 In
the same vein, former chairman of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) Harvey L. Pitt and former attorney of the Division of
Enforcement of the SEC Karen L. Shapiro point out that, “[f]ar from
being responsible for their employees’ violations of the law . . . most of
the employers who have had the unfortunate experience of employing
[insider traders] are in fact the only true victims, in an otherwise
victimless crime.”2
It is clear that not all insider trading is victimless, and not all
employers of insider traders are innocent. But I am convinced that
these critics are correct to point out that the current enforcement
regime is absurdly overbroad in that it affords no principled guarantee
to corporate victims of insider trading that they will not be indicted for
the crimes perpetrated against them.
The law should be reformed to ensure that corporations are only
held criminally liable where they are guilty of some wrongdoing. Part II
of this Article outlines current law in the United States concerning
corporate criminal liability in general. Part III looks at corporate
© 2016, John P. Anderson. All rights reserved. Associate Professor of Law, Mississippi College
School of Law. J.D., University of Virginia School of Law; Ph.D. in Philosophy, University of Virginia;
B.A., with Honors, Phi Beta Kappa, University of California at Berkeley. Many thanks to Stetson
University College of Law for graciously hosting this wonderful symposium. It was an honor to
participate. Thanks also to Sara Sun Beale, Lucian Dervan, Joan MacLeod Heminway, Dmitriy
Kamensky, Paul Larkin, John Lauro, Eli Lederman, Kevin Napper, Ellen Podgor, Ciara Torres‐
Spelliscy, Gary Trombley, and Sandy Weinberg for their excellent presentations and thoughtful
comments.
1. JONATHAN R. MACEY, INSIDER TRADING: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND POLICY 65–66 (1991).
2. Harvey L. Pitt & Karen L. Shapiro, Securities Regulation by Enforcement: A Look Ahead at
the Next Decade, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 149, 240 (1990).
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liability for insider trading under the current regime. Part IV explains
why the current regime is absurdly overbroad and in dire need of
reform. Part V suggests some reforms that would render corporate
criminal liability for insider trading more rational, efficient, and just.
II. CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY IN GENERAL
Some have argued that the very idea of corporate criminal liability
is incoherent.3 After all, a crime requires both an actus reus (a guilty
act) and a mens rea (a guilty mind), but “corporations have no bodies or
limbs with which to perform actions and no brains in which mental
states can reside.”4 Indeed, up until the beginning of the twentieth
century, the general rule appeared to be that “[a] corporation cannot
commit trea[s]on, or felony, or other crim[es], in [its] corporate
capacity: though [its] members may, in their di[s]tinct individual
capacities.”5
Nevertheless, the rule that corporations could not incur criminal
liability was rejected by the United States Supreme Court in New York
Central & Hudson River Railroad Co. v. United States.6 A railroad
company and its assistant traffic managers were convicted for the
payment of illegal rebates on the shipment of sugar.7 Despite the
objection that imposing criminal liability on a corporation “is in reality
to punish the innocent stockholders,” the Court applied the civil

3. See generally, e.g., John Hasnas, The Centenary of a Mistake: One Hundred Years of
Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1329, 1333 (2009) (arguing that corporations are
“not morally responsible agents” and therefore cannot be “subject to criminal punishment”);
Manuel Velasquez, Debunking Corporate Moral Responsibility, 13 BUS. ETHICS Q. 531 (2003)
(discussing the fallacies attributed to the collectivist view that a corporation can be held
criminally liable).
4. Hasnas, supra note 3, at 1337. Professor Hasnas goes on to make the point that corporate
criminal liability is also problematic because corporate criminal punishment violates all three of
the following necessary conditions for criminal punishment:
(1) Criminal sanctions may be applied only when doing so advances a legitimate
purpose of punishment; (2) [c]riminal sanctions may be applied only when doing so
does not create an unacceptable risk of prosecutorial error or abuse; and (3)
[c]riminal sanctions may be applied only when necessary to address a public harm.
Id. at 1336.
5. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 455, 464 (1765). This view
was not, however, universally held. The Supreme Court’s opinion in New York Central & Hudson
River Railroad Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 492–93 (1909) cites an emerging trend of
contrary authorities. See also HARRY FIRST, BUSINESS CRIME 180 (1990) (“English courts even before
Blackstone had imposed liability on government entities for nuisance arising out of a failure to
keep up bridges and roads.”).
6. 212 U.S. 481 (1909).
7. Id. at 489.
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doctrine of respondeat superior to uphold the railroad’s conviction.8
The Court explained that, “in the interest of public policy,” it is
necessary to extend the civil doctrine of vicarious liability to the
criminal context in those circumstances where the law could not
otherwise be “effectually enforced.”9 The Court went on,
We see no valid objection in law, and every reason in public policy,
why the corporation, which profits by the transaction, and can only
act through its agents and officers, shall be held punishable by fine
because of the knowledge and intent of its agents to whom it has
intrusted authority to act . . . .10

At the end of the day, the Court concluded that “it cannot shut its
eyes to the fact that the great majority of business transactions in
modern times are conducted through [corporations].”11 Consequently,
“to give them immunity from all punishment because of the old and
exploded doctrine that a corporation cannot commit a crime would
virtually take away the only means of effectually controlling the
subject‐matter and correcting the abuses aimed at.”12
The Court in New York Central laid out a basic two‐part test for
when corporations may be held criminally liable for the acts of their
employees: (1) the employee must perform the criminal act within the
scope of their employment, and (2) the corporation must be an
intended beneficiary of the act.13 Subsequent courts have interpreted
these elements expansively. For example, in United States v. Hilton
Hotels Corp.,14 the Ninth Circuit held that the employee’s authority need
only be apparent, and it may be found even where the employee acts
contrary to express company policy or instructions.15 Some courts have
gone so far as to find that even criminal actions beyond the scope of an
employee’s real or apparent authority might be attributed to the

8. Id. at 492.
9. Id. at 494–95.
10. Id. at 495.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 495–96.
13. Id. at 493–96.
14. 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1973). See also United States v. Basic Constr. Co., 711 F.2d 570,
573 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that the lower court properly instructed the jury that corporate
intent can be shown by the actions or statements of those who “have apparent authority to make
policy for the corporation” (emphasis added)).
15. Hilton Hotels, 467 F.2d at 1004; see also Basic Constr., 711 F.2d at 573 (recognizing that a
corporation can be held criminally responsible even when an employee’s acts “were against
corporate policy or express instruction”).
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corporation if management or the board does not take active measures
to stop it.16
The test for whether an employee’s criminal act was “with the
intent to benefit the corporation” has also been interpreted quite
liberally.17 The employee’s action need not actually benefit the
corporation to satisfy the test;18 it may even prove detrimental to the
corporation.19 It need not even be the case that the employee’s primary
intent was to benefit the firm;20 acts motivated principally by self‐
interest may be imputed to the corporation where a jury might find
that at least part of the employee’s motivation—“however
befuddled”—was to benefit the corporation.21 Indeed, at least one
commentator suggests that corporate liability may be found where,
absent any clear intent to benefit the firm, employees could have
reasonably believed the firm would benefit.22
Ultimately, the two‐part New York Central test for corporate
criminal liability has been interpreted so liberally by the courts that it
has, as one commentator puts it, been rendered “almost

16. See, e.g., Cont’l Baking Co. v. United States, 281 F.2d 137, 149 (6th Cir. 1960) (finding that
a jury could infer the employees’ authority when their superiors “failed to object to” the
employees’ acts); see also Mark A. Rush & Brian F. Saulnier, How Corporations Can Avoid or
Minimize Federal Criminal Liability for the Illegal Acts of Employees (1999), available at
http://www.klgates.com/files/Publication/2ddc7f0b‐92d6‐4d25‐b51be845d32b3c01/
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/98788628‐f44c‐43f4‐aa04‐1e92459b954c/Article_on
_Corporate_Criminal_Liability.pdf (discussing how courts have extended liability to instances
where employees acted outside the scope of actual or apparent authority but those actions went
unchecked, “giving the appearance of official approval”) (citing KATHLEEN F. BRICKEY, CORPORATE
CRIMINAL LIABILITY § 3:07, at 107 (2d ed. 1991)).
17. See, e.g., Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal
Liability, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1095, 1102–03 (1991) (discussing the requirement that a criminal act be
committed with the intent to benefit the corporation and how an act can satisfy that requirement
when the corporation received no benefit from the offense and those within the corporation were
unaware of the conduct when it occurred).
18. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. of Tex. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 128 (5th Cir. 1962)
(stating that an actual benefit to the corporation is not necessary to create liability).
19. United States v. Automated Med. Lab., Inc., 770 F.2d 399, 406–07 (4th Cir. 1985).
20. See, e.g., Automated Med. Lab., 770 F.2d at 407 (stating that liability can exist when an
agent acts for both his or her own benefit and for the corporation’s benefit); United States v. Gold,
743 F.2d 800, 823 (11th Cir. 1984) (finding that an employee must only intend to benefit the
corporation “in part”); United States v. Beusch, 596 F.2d 871, 877–78 (9th Cir. 1979) (discussing
the requirement of the intent to benefit the corporation).
21. United States v. Sun‐Diamond Growers of Cal., 138 F.3d 961, 970 (D.C. Cir. 1998). See also
Local 1814, Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. NLRB, 735 F.2d 1384, 1395 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“[T]he acts
of an agent motivated partly by self‐interest—even where self‐interest is the predominant
motive—lie within the scope of employment so long as the agent is actuated by the principal’s
business purposes ‘to any appreciable extent.’”).
22. See, e.g., Hasnas, supra note 3, at 1338 (citing Steere Tank Lines v. United States, 330 F.2d
719, 722–24 (5th Cir. 1964) as holding that “a corporation could be liable for the illegal actions of
truck drivers who reasonably could believe the corporation benefited from and demanded such
actions.”).
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meaningless.”23 The practical reality is that whether a corporation is or
is not charged for the crimes of its employees is less a function of the
two‐part New York Central test than it is a matter of prosecutorial
whim.24 This breadth in prosecutorial discretion leaves corporations
extremely vulnerable and “invites abuse.”25
In January 2003, the then Deputy Attorney General Larry D.
Thompson issued a memorandum (Thompson Memorandum) offering
guidelines for prosecutors in the exercise of their discretion to charge a
corporation with a criminal offense.26 The Thompson Memorandum
encouraged prosecutors to consider factors such as the “nature and
seriousness of the offense,” the “pervasiveness of wrongdoing within
the corporation,” the “adequacy of the corporation’s compliance
program,” and the corporation’s “voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing
and its willingness to cooperate.”27 Most controversially, in
determining whether a corporation was willing to “cooperate,” the
Thompson Memorandum permitted prosecutors to consider (1)
whether a firm was willing to waive its “attorney‐client and work
product protection”28 and (2) whether it has declined to pay attorneys’
fees for implicated employees.29 These latter factors demonstrate just
how far the Department of Justice (DOJ) managed to leverage its
virtually limitless discretion to prosecute corporations and force firms
to effectively “[sign] on as deputy prosecutorial agents” against
themselves and their own employees.30 The government may, however,
have become a bit too greedy in pressing its advantage. Backlash from
business groups, civil liberties organizations, and judges ultimately
forced the Department of Justice to soften its stance somewhat.31 In
23. Bucy, supra note 17, at 1102.
24. See Sun-Diamond, 138 F.3d at 970 (providing “the only thing that keeps deceived
corporations from being indicted for the acts of their employee‐deceivers is not some fixed rule of
law or logic but simply the sound exercise of prosecutorial discretion”). See also Howard J. Kaplan,
Corporate Criminal Liability for Insider Trading, ABA SECTION OF LITIGATION (December 4, 2014),
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/securities/articles/fall2014‐1114‐corporate‐
criminal‐liability‐insider‐trading.html (providing the same quotation from Sun-Diamond).
25. Hasnas, supra note 3, at 1342.
26. Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Heads
of Dep’t Components & All U.S. Attorneys, Principles of Federal Prosecutions of Business
Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
migrated/poladv/priorities/privilegewaiver/2003jan20_privwaiv_dojthomp.authcheckdam.pdf
[hereinafter Thompson Memorandum].
27. Id. at 4.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 7–8.
30. Hasnas, supra note 3, at 1354.
31. See, e.g., Ashby Jones, Thompson Memo Out, McNulty Memo In, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 12, 2006),
available at http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2006/12/12/thompson‐memo‐out‐mcnulty‐memo‐in
(providing a report on the “McNulty Memorandum” written by U.S. Deputy Attorney General Paul

152

Stetson Law Review

[Vol. 46

December 2006, then Deputy Attorney General Paul J. McNulty issued
new guidelines that, while retaining most of the same language from
the Thompson Memorandum, now require that prosecutors seek
approval from the Deputy Attorney General before requesting that
firms waive privilege and only allow consideration of advancing
attorneys’ fees for employees under extraordinary circumstances.32
Nevertheless, a recent memorandum issued by Deputy Attorney
General Sally Quillian Yates looks to recover some of this lost ground
and functionally revive the privilege waiver demand by requiring that
entities turn over “all relevant facts” in order to receive “any”
cooperation credit.33 In sum, vast prosecutorial discretion continues to
leave the government holding all the cards. As U.S. Attorney Preet
Bharara, who made the cover of Time Magazine in 2012 as the man
who is “Busting Wall Street,” himself put it, “the corporation is
particularly ill‐equipped to defend itself . . . against the power of
prosecutors to prove virtually any corporate entity guilty upon showing
criminal conduct on the part of at least one employee.”34 In other words,
corporations have no choice but to “cooperate,” and prosecutors are
free to decide what that means.35
Even before the Thompson, McNulty, and Yates Memoranda, the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, promulgated in 1991, imposed
essentially the same incentive structure on corporations to self‐police
and “cooperate” with the government. Under the Sentencing
Guidelines, a corporation reduces its culpability score by maintaining
“effective compliance and ethics programs,” and by “self‐reporting,
cooperation, or acceptance of responsibility.”36 Though these credits
J. McNulty to supplement the Thompson Memorandum). See also United States v. Stein, 541 F.3d
130, 136 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding the defendants not guilty and instead ruling that the government
had an “overwhelming influence”).
32. Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Heads of
Dep’t Components & All U.S. Attorneys, Principles of Federal Prosecutions of Business Organizations
(Dec. 12, 2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/dag/legacy/2007/07/
05/mcnulty_memo.pdf [hereinafter McNulty Memorandum].
33. Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Heads of
Dep’t Components & All U.S. Attorneys, Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing at 3–4
(Sept. 9, 2015) available at https://www.justice.gov/dag/file/769036/download [hereinafter
Yates Memorandum].
34. Preet Bharara, Corporations Cry Uncle and Their Employees Cry Foul: Rethinking
Prosecutorial Pressure on Corporate Defendants, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 53, 70–71 (2007) (emphasis
added).
35. See generally Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New Corporate Criminal
Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 311 (2007) (examining the constitutional implications of the
corporate cooperation doctrine).
36. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8A1.1, at 499, § 8B2.1 at 509 (2015); see also Ellen S.
Podgor, Educating Compliance, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1523, 1528 n.37 (2009) (elaborating on the
ways that a corporation can reduce capability through the Sentencing Guidelines).
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under the Sentencing Guidelines are offered in the form of post‐
conviction carrots, they end up functioning as hefty pre‐indictment
sticks when coupled with limitless prosecutorial discretion under the
courts’ liberal interpretations of New York Central. These Sentencing
Guidelines, like the above‐described DOJ memoranda, effectively
deputize corporations against their employees and themselves.37
But recall that the guiding policy behind New York Central’s
recognition of corporate criminal liability was to fill an enforcement
gap—to create otherwise absent incentives for firms to police the
conduct of their own employees. In other words, effectively deputizing
firms to perform a law‐enforcement function was precisely the
Supreme Court’s objective. Presumably the idea was that the clear
benefits of increased enforcement would outweigh the inevitable harm
of punishing innocent shareholders. Even keeping this broad policy
justification in mind, however, corporate criminal liability in the
context of insider trading presents some unique problems.
III.

CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR INSIDER TRADING: THE
PERFECT STORM

The crime of insider trading has never been defined by statute or
by rule. Congress and the SEC have elected to allow the definition of
insider trading to develop through the courts and administrative
proceedings. The primary statutory authority for insider trading
liability is Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,38 which
is implemented by the SEC in Exchange Act Rule 10b–5.39 Section 10(b)
prohibits the employment of “any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance” in “connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.”40 Though Congress intended Section 10(b) as a “catchall”
provision, the Supreme Court has held that “what it catches must be
fraud.”41 Insider traders, however, typically gain their trading
advantage by failing to disclose material nonpublic information, not by
making affirmative misrepresentations. Under the common law, such
trading is fraudulent only where there is a duty to disclose.42 The

37. See, e.g., Hasnas, supra note 3, at 1354 (“[T]he New York Central standard brings almost
irresistible pressure on corporations to do whatever they can to avoid indictment, which means
signing on as deputy prosecutorial agents.” (footnote omitted)).
38. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
39. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5–1 (2014).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
41. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234–35 (1980).
42. Id. at 228 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1977)).

154

Stetson Law Review

[Vol. 46

Supreme Court has recognized two theories whereby Section 10(b)
insider trading liability will result from a failure to disclose: (1) the
“classical theory,” which addresses true insider trading (trading by
issuers, their employees, or persons otherwise affiliated with the
issuer); and (2) the “misappropriation theory,” which is broad enough
to address outsider trading (trading by persons who are not affiliated
with the issuer).43
Liability is incurred under the classical theory where the issuer, its
employee, or someone otherwise affiliated with the issuer seeks to
benefit from trading (or tipping others who trade) that firm’s shares
based on material nonpublic information. Here the insider violates a
“fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence” to the
current or prospective shareholder on the other side of the
transaction.44 Under the misappropriation theory, Section 10(b)
liability is incurred where one misappropriates material nonpublic
information and, unbeknownst to the source, seeks to benefit by
trading (or tipping others who trade) on this information. While the
classical theory finds the trader’s duty to disclose in a fiduciary
relationship with the counterparty to the trade, “the misappropriation
theory premises liability on a fiduciary‐turned‐trader’s deception of
those who entrusted him with access to confidential information” by
cheating them “of the exclusive use of that information.”45
Section 10(b) is not a criminal statute, but Section 32(a) of the
Exchange Act makes any willful violation of the Act a crime. Under
Section 32(a),
Any person who willfully violates any provision of this chapter, or
any rule or regulation thereunder the violation of which is made
unlawful or the observance of which is required under the terms of
this chapter . . . shall upon conviction be fined not more than [five
million dollars] or imprisoned not more than [twenty] years, or
both, except that when such person is a person other than a natural
person, a fine not exceeding [twenty‐five million dollars] may be
imposed.46

These criminal penalties are stiff. And, in addition, the Insider Trading
and Securities Enforcement Act of 1988 (ITSFEA) extended the civil
43. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651–53 (1997) (describing the differences
between the classical theory and the misappropriation theory).
44. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228.
45. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652.
46. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a).
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penalty of treble damages—once reserved to individual traders47—to
“controlling persons.”48 When the prosecutor’s complete discretion to
charge corporations for any and all insider trading by their employees
under New York Central and its progeny is combined with the threat of
these considerable sanctions, corporations’ incentives to self‐police—
for example, by implementing strong insider trading compliance
programs—is obvious.
But there is a problem that renders firms even more helpless at
the hands of prosecutors when facing potential insider trading liability.
Both the classical and misappropriation theories of insider trading
liability involve persons who seek to “benefit” from trading “on the
basis of” “material” “nonpublic” information in violation of a “fiduciary
or other similar relation of trust and confidence,” but no one seems to
agree on a clear definition of any one of these terms.49 Though the SEC
and Congress have had ample opportunity to bring clarity to the law by
promulgating a statutory or rule‐based definition of insider trading,
they have expressly declined to do so for fear that it would deprive
prosecutors and regulators of necessary flexibility in enforcement.50
The result is a perfect storm for corporations. They cannot avoid
liability for the insider trading of their employees, but they cannot
prevent it through effective compliance programs because they do not
have a clear idea of what it is they are supposed to prevent.
This problem is particularly acute for issuers, who often
compensate their employees with firm shares and therefore must
provide those employees with some opportunity to sell their shares. I
have described this problem elsewhere as the “paradox of insider
trading compliance.”51 But this is not the only problem with insider
trading liability for corporations; it also has the defect of often being
completely incoherent.
47. See WILLAM K.S. WANG & MARC I. STIENBERG, INSIDER TRADING 812 (3d ed. 2010).
48. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100–704, 102
Stat. 4677 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2012)).
49. See, e.g., John P. Anderson, Solving the Paradox of Insider Trading Compliance, 88 TEMPLE L.
REV. 273, 278–87 (2016) (elaborating on the absence of definitions for the elements of insider
trading but instead calling for not only definitions, but the current enforcement regime to be
liberalized generally).
50. See, e.g., STEPHEN BAINBRIDGE, INSIDER TRADING: LAW AND POLICY 145 n.30 (2014) (“The
[House] committee feared that any definition would have to be either so broad as to be
unworkable or so narrow as to reduce the SEC’s and the court’s flexibility to address new forms of
trading.”).
51. See Anderson, supra note 49, at 295–96 (“This is the paradox of insider trading
compliance for issuers: ambiguity in the law combined with the threat of stiff reputational and
legal sanctions creates a perverse incentive to adopt compliance programs that are highly
inefficient and ultimately costly to shareholders.” (citations omitted)).
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DOES IT MAKE SENSE?

There is a great deal of controversy over whether insider trading
is a victimless crime. I think the answer is that insider trading does not
have to create victims. Under a different insider trading enforcement
regime, some forms of insider trading would be both morally
permissible and economically beneficial for society as a whole.52 But
that is not the regime under which we live. The current regime—
irrational and inefficient as it is—has created market expectations that
are disappointed by insider trading. The victims of insider trading are
not always the counterparties to the insider’s transactions; they vary
depending on the type of insider trading that occurs. This Part begins
by identifying the different victims that the law identifies as resulting
from the various categories of insider trading under the current U.S.
enforcement regime. Identifying these victims of insider trading
exposes an absurdity in the context of corporate criminal liability. It
turns out that in most (though not all) cases where a corporation is
subject to criminal liability for the insider trading of its employees, it
(or its shareholders) is by theory of law also the principal victim of that
same trading. This leads to the absurd result that the victim is liable for
the crime.
A. Victim of True Insider Trading Under the Classical Theory
As noted above, under the classical theory, when a true insider
(whether the issuer itself, a board member, senior management, or a
low‐level employee) profits by trading in the firm’s shares based on
material nonpublic information, the fraud is perpetrated on the
counterparty.53 In such cases, the counterparty will always be a current
or prospective shareholder who, as such, is owed a fiduciary or similar
duty of trust and confidence that warrants disclosure prior to trading.
The insider profits by deception, and the current or prospective
shareholder with whom she trades is the victim of this deception.
As noted above, corporate criminal liability exposes firms to
astronomical monetary fines.54 Moreover, history suggests that the
52. See, e.g., John P. Anderson, Greed, Envy, and the Criminalization of Insider Trading, 2014
UTAH L. REV. 1 (2014); see also John P. Anderson, What’s the Harm in Issuer-Licensed Insider
Trading?, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 795 (2015) (arguing that “non‐promissory” or “issuer‐licensed”
insider trading is morally permissible under the right conditions, and that permitting such trading
would likely improve market efficiency).
53. Supra Part III.
54. Id.
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uncertainty accompanying a criminal indictment alone can cause a
corporation’s sources of capital to evaporate, ultimately resulting in the
firm’s collapse.55 Who suffers these consequences? As Professor Hasnas
explains, “To the extent that such a loss cannot be passed along to
consumers, it is the owners of the corporation, the shareholders, who
incur the penalty.”56 But, while almost all corporate criminal liability
forces innocent shareholders to bear the punishment,57 the case of
insider trading is unique in that, as demonstrated above, the theory of
criminal liability itself also identifies these same shareholders as the
victims.58 Consequently, shareholders are forced to suffer the crime and
the punishment!
Recall that in New York Central, the Court weighed the concern
that imposing corporate criminal liability might sometimes force
innocent shareholders to pay a price for the corporation’s crimes.59
With this concern in mind, the Court nevertheless held that corporate
criminal liability may still be warranted in those cases where no other
effective means of protecting the public are available.60 The Court
presumably reasoned that in such cases, the wrong of penalizing
innocent shareholders was outweighed by the wrong of leaving
innocent victims unprotected or by the wrong of undermining the
policy advanced by the relevant statute.61 But this rationale cannot
justify corporate criminal liability for true insider trading under the
classical theory. Imposing harsh penalties on the innocent shareholders
whom the theory of liability also identifies as the victims of the crime is
just plain absurd, and it does not jibe with the Court’s reasoning in New
York Central.
B. Victim of True Insider Trading Under the Misappropriation Theory
As a number of scholars have pointed out, there is no reason that
true insiders cannot also incur Section 10(b) liability for insider trading

55. Witness the collapse of Drexel Burnham Lambert in the 1980s and the collapse of Arthur
Anderson in the wake of the Enron scandal of 2001. See, e.g., JAMES B. STEWART, THE DEN OF THIEVES
(1991, 2010) (chronicling the demise of Drexel Burnham Lambert).
56. Hasnas, supra note 3, at 1339.
57. Id. (“The defining characteristic of the modern corporation is the separation of ownership
and control. The shareholders . . . have no direct control over or knowledge of the behavior of the
corporate employees who commit the criminal offenses.”).
58. Supra Part III.
59. Supra Part II.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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based on the misappropriation theory.62 As Professor Donna Nagy puts
it, “Although O’Hagan depicted its misappropriation theory as a
‘complement’ to the classical theory, there is no reason for eschewing a
misappropriation analysis simply because an insider owes disclosure
duties to the corporation’s shareholders as well [as to] the corporation
that entrusted him with the information.”63 When a true insider incurs
Section 10(b) liability under the misappropriation theory, the fraud is
actually perpetrated on the issuer. The O’Hagan Court explained that
“[a] company’s confidential information . . . qualifies as property to
which the company has a right of exclusive use. The undisclosed
misappropriation of such information, in violation of a fiduciary
duty . . . constitutes fraud akin to embezzlement.”64
The incoherence of derivative corporate criminal liability for the
true insider trading of its employees under the misappropriation
theory is even more blatant than under the classical theory. The
absurdity of holding a firm criminally liable for its employees’
embezzlement is palpable, but this is precisely what corporate criminal
liability for true insider trading amounts to under the misappropriation
theory. Certainly the policy rational behind New York Central cannot
support corporate criminal liability under such circumstances.
C. Victim of Source‐Employee Outsider Trading Under the
Misappropriation Theory
The Supreme Court first recognized the misappropriation theory
to fill a gap in the classical theory’s coverage—namely that it failed to
capture outsiders who look to profit by trading on material, nonpublic
information in breach of a fiduciary or similar duty of trust and

62. See, e.g., DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING: REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT & PREVENTION
§ 6‐1 (West vol. 18, 2015) (“Virtually all cases that could be brought [under the classical theory]
can also be styled as misappropriation cases.”); WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 47, at 492 (“In most
instances, both the Commission and private plaintiffs could recast a classical special relationship
case as involving ‘misappropriation.’”).
63. Donna M. Nagy, Beyond Dirks: Gratuitous Tipping and Insider Trading, 42 J. CORP. L.
(forthcoming Fall 2016) (manuscript at 21–22), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract_id=2665820. Indeed, Professor Nagy suggests that misappropriation may become
the theory of liability de jour for the SEC and prosecutors in even true insider trading cases if the
Second Circuit’s decision in United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014) stands. Id. at
24–26. Nagy points out that the misappropriation theory as articulated in O’Hagan and other
cases may not require the same showing of a quid pro quo to establish the benefit element for
insider trading liability. Id. at 20–22. Though the Supreme Court denied certiorari on Newman, 84
USLW 3064 (Oct. 5, 2015), it has since granted certiorari in another tipper/tippee insider trading
case, United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2015).
64. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 654 (1997) (citations omitted).
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confidence.65 The O’Hagan Court held that since the impact on the
parties and the market is the same in both cases, it makes little sense to
hold a lawyer, like O’Hagan, liable under section 10(b) if he works for a
law firm representing the target of a takeover (as he would be under
the classical theory), but not if he works for the bidder.66
This Part focuses on “source‐employee” outsider trading under the
misappropriation theory. Here the outsider misappropriation trading is
done by an employee of the information’s source. Such insider trading
is perpetrated by an employee against his employer.67 Take, for
example, the case of Carpenter v. United States.68 In that case, a Wall
Street Journal (Journal) reporter was prosecuted for trading in advance
of the publication of his daily stock‐picking column.69 The column was
popular and usually had an impact on stock prices. The Journal’s policy
was that, prior to publication, the content of the column was the
Journal’s confidential information.70 In violation of this policy, the
reporter, R. Foster Winans, entered into an arrangement whereby he
and others would profit by trading on this information in advance of
publication.71 Under the New York Central test, there is nothing other
than the exercise of prosecutorial discretion that prevented the Journal
from being indicted for Winan’s trading. This, as Professor Macey
points out, is “ironic in light of the fact that the Supreme Court ‘went to
great lengths to indicate that the [Journal] had been victimized by
Winans and his cohorts.’”72

65. Id. at 659.
66. Id.
67. The facts of Chiarella v. United States offer an example. 445 U.S. 222 (1980). In that case,
the mark‐up man for a financial printer learned the identities of takeover targets in advance of the
market. Id. He then profited on this nonpublic information by purchasing shares in the target
companies in advance of the public announcements. Id. at 224. Though the Supreme Court had not
recognized the misappropriation theory at the time Chiarella was decided, these facts would
support liability under the misappropriation theory because Chiarella breached a duty of trust
and confidence to his employer in using the information to trade. Id. The facts in O’Hagan, the case
in which the Court expressly recognized the misappropriation theory, involved a partner’s
misappropriation of information concerning a takeover bid from his law firm. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at
648. Based on this nonpublic information, O’Hagan acquired positions in the target company and
profited by over four million dollars when the takeover was announced. Id.
68. 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
69. Id. at 22–23.
70. Id. at 23.
71. Id. Carpenter was convicted under federal mail and wire fraud statutes, as well as under
the misappropriation theory of Section 10(b) liability. On appeal, the Supreme Court was evenly
divided with respect to the convictions pursuant to the misappropriation theory of 10(b) liability.
Id. at 24. Thus, while the lower court’s judgment was affirmed, the misappropriation theory did
not become Supreme Court precedent until O’Hagan was decided ten years later.
72. MACEY, supra note 1, at 65–66 (quoting Pitt & Shapiro, supra note 2, at 240–41, n.388).
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D. Victim of Third‐Party Insider/Outsider Trading
What I shall refer to as “third‐party” insider or outsider trading
occurs where the violation of fiduciary or similar duty of trust and
confidence that makes the trading fraudulent is committed against
someone other than the trader’s employer or shareholders in the
trader’s firm. Third‐party traders are sometimes tippees, who may be
held derivatively liable under either the classical or misappropriation
theories of liability.73 But third‐party traders might also be directly
liable under the misappropriation theory where they trade in violation
of a fiduciary or similar duty of trust and confidence to a third party.74
For purposes of this Article, I am only concerned with third‐party
traders whose trading might somehow be interpreted as being within
the scope of their employment and for the benefit of their employer
under New York Central.75 Third‐party traders fitting this description
are typically employed within the financial industry.
Imagine that Timmy, a trader for the hedge fund ABC Capital, pays
an insider at Big‐Strike Mining Corporation for material, nonpublic
information concerning the company’s recent discovery of a major gold
deposit in North Dakota. Timmy purchases all the ABC shares he can
get his hands on for ABC Capital. ABC makes millions after the
announcement, and Timmy receives a generous bonus. Who are the
victims of Timmy’s insider trading? As explained above, under the
classical theory, the counterparties to the trading are the victims, and
under the misappropriation theory, Big Strike is the victim. ABC Capital
is not a victim under either theory. Moreover, Timmy’s trades benefited
ABC and were squarely within his scope of employment under New
York Central. Consequently, by contrast to the trading analyzed in Parts
IV(A),76 IV(B),77 and IV(C)78 above, holding ABC Capital derivatively
73. See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 659–60 (1982) (discussing tippee liability). Though
Dirks addressed tipper/tippee liability under the classical theory, subsequent cases make it clear
that the same derivative liability applies in the misappropriation context as well. See, e.g., J. Kelly
Strader, (Re)Conceptualizing Insider Trading, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 1419, 1435 (2015) (applying Dirks
to misappropriation cases).
74. The recent indictment of Tiger Asia Management LLC offers an example. See, e.g., David
Voreacos, Tiger Asia Admits Guilt in $60 Million Court Settlement, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 13, 2012),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012‐12‐12/tiger‐asia‐management‐hedge‐fund‐
said‐to‐plan‐guilty‐plea.
75. For example, even under the most liberal interpretation, the New York Central test would
not license derivative corporate liability for Dunkin’ Donuts when one of its employees trades in
Apple shares based on an illegal tip from an insider at Apple.
76. Supra Part IV(A).
77. Supra Part IV(B).
78. Supra Part IV(C).
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liable under Section 10(b) for Timmy’s insider trading does not suffer
the irony of holding the victim liable for the crime.
Moreover, consider the ABC Capital example above in light of the
policy considerations informing New York Central. Despite the risk that
corporate criminal liability will often punish innocent shareholders for
the crimes of the firm’s employees, the Court held that such liability
was warranted where, absent the incentives for self‐regulation
imposed by the threat of corporate criminal liability, there would be no
other effective means of protecting the public from morally hazardous
incentives set by the corporation.79 This is precisely the situation
presented by third‐party trading through hedge funds like ABC Capital
and other financial service firms. The recent example of SAC Capital
and its founder Steve Cohen (dubbed “the king of hedge funds”80) is
instructive.
As Professor Joan MacLeod Heminway puts it, in “terms of actual
knowledge, SAC’s business model may have kept Cohen purposefully in
the dark about the origins of information possessed by his analysts and
traders.”81 When you combine SAC’s strict stated policy against insider
trading and large compliance department82 with its extensive use of
“expert networks”83 and the “mosaic theory”84 to inform trading
decisions, Cohen, the firm’s principal, may have constructed a virtually
impregnable institutional shield of plausible deniability. From behind
this shield, Cohen was then free to pressure and lavishly incentivize
SAC’s traders to “develop an edge with information that no one else
had” or risk termination.85 Heminway suggests that the doctrine of
willful blindness might offer an avenue to tippee liability for principals
like Cohen, but its “elements may be difficult for public and private
enforcement agents to prove. And the relevant facts may be easy to
manipulate to the advantage of putative tippees.”86 The result at SAC
was that, though a number of employees were indicted and convicted

79. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 495–99 (1909).
80. Frances E. Chapman, Marianne Jennings & Lauren Tarasuk, SAC Capital: Firm Criminal
Liability, Civil Fines, and the Insulated CEO, 4 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 441, 443 (2015).
81. Joan MacLeod Heminway, Willful Blindness, Plausible Deniability and Tippee Liability: SAC,
Steven Cohen, and the Court’s Opinion in Dirks, 15 TRANSACTIONS TENN. J. BUS. L. 47, 51 (2013).
Heminway goes on, “[I]t may be that fund principals like Cohen can construct an information
gathering and trading operation that relies on the willful blindness of the principals, enabling
them to avoid insider trading liability as tippees.” Id. at 54.
82. Chapman, Jennings & Tarasuk, supra note 80, at 447.
83. Heminway, supra note 81, at 50.
84. CHARLES GASPARINO, CIRCLE OF FRIENDS 94 (2013).
85. Id. at 206.
86. Heminway, supra note 81, at 56.
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of insider trading, Cohen was effectively “untouchable.”87 As other
scholars put it, the law allows someone like Cohen “to set up an
operation in which they shield themselves from liability. They can pay
their fines, pay their employees’ legal fees, and still have a corporation
left to manage their personal fortune.”88 It turned out that the only way
to penetrate this “tight‐knit circle of greed”89 and reach Cohen himself
was to indict SAC Capital, and the DOJ did just that in July of 2013.90 It is
precisely this type of situation that the Supreme Court had in mind
when it recognized corporate criminal liability in New York Central. In
sum, if corporate criminal liability for insider trading is ever justified, it
is justified in these circumstances where a firm’s employees are
engaged in third‐party insider or outsider trading.
V.

PROPOSED REFORMS

To this point, I have argued that corporate criminal liability for
true insider trading under the classical theory,91 true insider trading
under the misappropriation theory,92 and source‐employee outsider
trading under the misappropriation theory leads to the absurd result of
punishing the victim for the crime.93 Moreover, recognizing corporate
criminal liability in these three circumstances is inconsistent with the
broader policy goals motivating New York Central.94 But not all
corporate criminal liability is problematic. The victim of third‐party
trading for a financial services firm is always someone outside the firm
(the counterparty or the third‐party source of the information). There
is therefore no obvious incoherence in punishing the corporation for
the employee’s crime.95 Moreover, in some cases a corporate criminal
indictment may be the only effective means of checking third‐party
tippee trading that is encouraged by a hedge fund or other financial
87. Chapman, Jennings & Tarasuk, supra note 80, at 445.
88. Id. at 459.
89. Id. at 448 (quoting U.S. Att’y Preet Bharara).
90. Id. at 443–44.
91. Supra Part IV(A).
92. Supra Part IV(B).
93. Supra Part IV(C).
94. See generally N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909)
(holding that the corporation should be liable for the acts of its agents).
95. I say no “obvious” incoherence to account for the arguments of Hasnas and Velasquez
(above) that all corporate criminal liability is problematic at least in part because it involves the
punishment of innocent shareholders. See generally Hasnas, supra note 3 (discussing the morality
of corporate criminal responsibility). Indeed, David Cohen reportedly complained that he, as
principal shareholder for SAC Capital was forced to pay more than one billion dollars in fines “for
the actions of what he calls ‘rogue employees.’” Chapman, Jennings & Tarasuk, supra note 80, at
460.
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services firm’s morally hazardous incentive structure. This is
particularly true where the high‐level architects of the firm’s incentive
structure are themselves effectively immune from insider trading
liability, and this is precisely the concern that motivated the Court’s
recognition of corporate criminal liability in New York Central.
Consistent with these conclusions, this Article proposes the
following reforms, though there is no space to develop them here.
Statutory constraints should be placed on prosecutors when indicting
corporations for insider trading under Section 10(b). Prosecutors
should be permitted to exercise their discretion in bringing
indictments against firms whose employees are engaged in third‐party
insider or outsider trading within the scope of their employment and
for the benefit of the firm, but they should be expressly precluded from
bringing indictments against corporations for the insider trading of
their employees under Section 10(b) in all other circumstances. This
proposed reform would, of course, still leave all employees individually
liable for their illegal insider trading.
I anticipate the objection that this is all much ado about nothing in
that corporations are rarely indicted for insider trading, and, when
they are, it is precisely the firms I have suggested that are legitimate
targets. Prior to the 1988 indictment of Drexel Burnham Lambert, only
individuals had been indicted for insider trading.96 Since then, very few
firms have been indicted for insider trading, and most of those that
have been indicted would be legitimate targets even if the proposed
reform were implemented.97 But this only tells half the story.
Prosecutors are mindful of the often disastrous, and therefore
politically harmful, collateral consequences of a corporate indictment.98
Experience has taught them that the mere threat of an indictment gives
them all the power they need to either force a change in firms’
compliance practices, or to force corporations to cooperate in the
government’s investigations of the firm or its employees. The recent
increase in Deferred Prosecution Agreements and the recent Yates

96. See FIRST, supra note 5, at 159. This indictment, and other events surrounding it,
ultimately led to the firm’s collapse in 1990. For a brilliant account of this, see STEWART, supra note
55.
97. See, e.g., United States v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1993) (third‐party investment
firm); United States v. Marcus Schloss & Co., Inc., 724 F. Supp. 1123 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (third‐party
brokerage firm); Voreacos, supra note 74 (third‐party hedge fund); see also United States v. S.A.C.
Capital Advisors, L.P., No. 13 Civ. 5182, 2013 WL 5913921 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2013) (third‐party
hedge fund).
98. Supra note 55. The downfalls of Arthur Anderson and Drexel Burnham Lambert offer
recent examples.
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Memorandum are clear reflections of this strategy. As Professor Hasnas
puts it,
It has become apparent that the purpose of corporate criminal
liability is not to punish corporations, but to force them to
cooperate in the prosecution of their employees. This is evidenced
by the constantly increasing number of federal criminal
investigations of business organizations that end in Deferred
Prosecution Agreement coupled with a constantly decreasing
number which end with corporate indictments and convictions. It is
anachronistic to think of the purpose of corporate prosecution as
the imposition of punishment upon conviction. Today, it is
corporate indictment that is the punishment and lack of
cooperation that is the offense.99

The mere threat of indictment for the insider trading of its
employees has forced issuers to adopt overbroad insider trading
compliance programs that come at a heavy price in terms of corporate
culture, cost of compensation, share liquidity, and cost of capital.100
Moreover, recent criminal investigations of employee use of Exchange
Act Rule 10b5–1(c) trading plans101 have also put issuers on the
defensive concerning the possible insider trading of their employees.102
This Article has suggested that any leverage derived by prosecutors
from (1) the threat of indicting issuers for the insider trading of their
employees under either the classical or misappropriation theories, or
(2) from the threat of indicting source‐companies for the insider
trading of their employees under the misappropriation theory, is
illegitimate.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Court in New York Central recognized that “there are some
crimes, which in their nature cannot be committed by corporations.”103
This Article has suggested that true insider trading and source‐
employee outsider trading are crimes that cannot be committed by a
company. Corporate criminal liability in these circumstances yields the
99. Hasnas, supra note 3, at 1354.
100. See generally Anderson, Solving the Paradox of Insider Trading Compliance, supra note 49
(explaining the costs and issues associated with insider trading compliance programs).
101. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5‐1(c) (2014).
102. See, e.g., John P. Anderson, Anticipating a Sea Change for Insider Trading Law: From
Trading Plan Crisis to Rational Reform, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 339 (2015) (discussing the vast amount
of change that has occurred within the area of insider trading).
103. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494 (1909).
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absurd result of punishing the victims for the crime. Prosecutors
should, however, continue to enjoy discretion to hold corporations
liable for the third‐party insider or outsider trading of their employees.
Finally, the reforms proposed here would not affect individual liability
for insider trading under any theory.

